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Abstract
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) is a well-known
benchmark for studying the long term behaviours of
rational agents, such as how cooperation can emerge
among selfish and unrelated agents that need to co-exist
over long term. Many well-known strategies have been
studied, form the simple tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy made
famous by Axelrod after his influential tournaments
to more involved ones like zero determinant strategies
studied recently by Press and Dyson. In this paper,
following Press and Dyson, we consider one memory
probabilistic strategies. We consider what we call in-
vincible strategies: a strategy is invincible if it never
loses against any other strategy in terms of average pay-
off in the limit, if the limit exists. We show a strategy
is invincible iff p4 = 0 and p2 + p3 ≤ 1, where p4 is
the probability of playing C given that the profile in the
previous round is (D,D) (meaning both defected in the
last round), and similarly p2 and p3 are the probability
of playingC when the profiles in the previous round are
(C,D) and (D,C), respectively.
Introduction
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is a classical problem to under-
stand rational agents’ behavior. It involves two agents play-
ing repeatedly the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In PD, each
player can choose between Cooperate (C) and Defect (D).
If both choose C, they receive a payoff of R (rewards); If
both choose D, they receive a payoff of P (penalty); If one
chooses C and the other D, the defector receives a payoff
of T (temptation to defect) and the cooperator a payoff of S
(socker’s payoff). Table 1 gives a normal form representa-
tion of this game (Rapoport and Chammah 1965).
C D
C (C,C) (S,T)
D (T,S) (P,P)
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Under the assumption that T > R > P > S, the pro-
file (D,D) is the dominant Nash equilibrium of the game.
However, both would receive a higher payoff of R if they
decide to cooperate. There is no controversy what a rational
agent would do when playing PD. However, if the game is
repeated indefintely, it is not clear which if any strategy is the
best. In fact, researchers from diverse disciplines have used
the IPD to study the emergence of cooperation among unre-
lated agents. Robert Axelrod was the first to run computer
tournaments on iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Surprisingly, a
simple Tit-For-Tat strategy won the tournaments. Axelrod
concluded that this simple cooperative strategy won them
for good reasons, and, together with his collaborators, ap-
plied this observation to evolutionary biology, among other
things (Hamilton and Axelrod 1981). In 2012 Press and
Dyson (Press and Dyson 2012) dramatically changed peo-
ple’s understanding of this problem by deriving what they
called zero determinant (ZD) strategies. Of particular in-
terests is a subclass of these strategies called extortionate
strategies that can enforce an extortionate linear relation be-
tween the players’ scores. After the discovery of ZD strate-
gies, Stewart and Plotkin (Stewart and Plotkin 2012) did an-
other computer tournament with the addition of some ZD
strategies. The results were that ZD strategies are similar
to mean strategies like Always Defect. While they would
won most number of games but still got low average pay-
offs. Generous strategies like TFT still have higher average
payoffs. Hilbe et al. (Hilbe, Nowak, and Sigmund 2013)
did some experiments and concluded that with large enough
populations, extortionate strategies can actually act as cata-
lysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat,
but that they are not the stable outcome of natural selection.
An agent is in dilemma when faced with an extortionate
co-player. If it chooses to cooperate, it automatically ac-
cepts the extortion and gives the co-player more payoff. If it
defects, itself will receive a punishment payoff of P. While
studying whether there is any way to retaliate against the ex-
tortioners, we disappointedly find that extortioners are actu-
ally invincible. This invincible property guarantees the suc-
cess of extortion, thus foes cannot think out any strategy to
revenge.
In this paper we study a class of strategies called invinci-
ble strategies. Such strategies would never lose against any
other strategies in terms of limit of average payoffs. We’ll
see that these strategies include many well-known ones such
as TFT, Always Defect and extortionate strategies. The char-
acterization of these strategies turned out to be surprisingly
concise, and we derive them by modeling iterated prisoner’s
dilemma as a Markov process as in (Press and Dyson 2012).
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
introduce iterated prisoner’s dilemma and important tourna-
ments. Next we make a brief review of Press and Dyson’s
work of zero determinant strategies. Following that we give
the characteristic and proof of invincible strategy, then we
describe some experimental results on these strategies.
Background
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
As mentioned, IPD is just repeated PD given in Table 1, with
the following restrictions on the payoff numbers:
• T > R > P > S. This makes (D,D) the dominant equi-
librium in PD.
• 2R > T + S. This makes (C,C) the best payoff for both
players in the long run.
One concrete example of Prisoner’s Dilemma is,
C D
C (3,3) (0,5)
D (5,0) (1,1)
Table 2: Prison’s Dilemma Game (concrete example)
The Prisoners Dilemma itself is well established as a way
to study the emergence of cooperative behavior. If the Pris-
oners Dilemma is played only once, it always pays to defect
- even though both players would benefit by both cooperat-
ing. If the game is played more than once, however, other
strategies, that reward cooperation and punish defection, can
dominate the defectors, especially when played in a spatial
context or for an indeterminate number of rounds(Alexrod
1983).
We calculate the payoff of iterated prisoner’s dilemma by
average payoff in the limit (cf. (Shoham and Leyton-Brown
2008)): Given an infinite sequence of payoffs r(1)i , r
(2)
i , ...
for player i, the average payoff of i is
r¯ = lim
k→∞
∑k
j=1 r
(j)
i
k
Tournaments of IPD
As mentioned, in Axelrod’s landmark tournaments of iter-
ated prisoner’s dilemma (Alexrod 1983), Tit-For-Tat proved
to be an extraordinarily successful way to foster coopera-
tion and accumulate a large payoff. Tit-For-Tat is a strat-
egy which cooperates if his opponent cooperates on the
last round, and otherwise defect. This tournament inspires
much discussion about Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (see,
e.g. (Kendall, Yao, and Chong 2007)).
In order to test whether zero determinant strategies en-
joy advantage in Axelrod’s original tournament, Stewart and
Plotkin(Stewart and Plotkin 2012) reran that competition
with the addition of some ZD strategies in 2012. Extor-
tionate Strategy Extort-2 forces the relationship sX − P =
2(sY − P ), where sX and sY represent the players’ scores.
On the other hand, Generous Strategy ZDGTFT-2 forces the
relationship sX − R = 2(sY − R) between the players’
scores. ZDGTFT-2 is a more generous strategy, which of-
fers its opponent a higher portion of payoffs above P.
Two metrics are considered for this tournament, i.e. av-
erage payoff and wins of pairwise matches. In terms of av-
erage payoff, ZDGTFT-2 receives the highest score, higher
even than Tit-For-Tat and Generous-Tit-For-Tat, the tradi-
tional winners. Extort-2 was second worst, only getting a
score a bit higher than Always Defect. Since evolution-
ary agents are not included in this tournament, extortionate
strategies cannot take advantage of them. As for pairwise
competition, Always Defect wins most matches, followed
by Extort-2. ZDGTFT-2, Tit-For-Tat and Generous-Tit-For-
Tat cannot win a single match because of their generosity.
The tournament results can be reproduced by Vincent’s
python library (Knight et al. 2016).In this paper, we are able
to explain the result of pairwise competitions and introduce
an infinite number of strategies to win most head-to-head
matches.
One Memory Strategies
One memory strategies are strategies which base its response
entirely on the outcome of the previous round. It con-
sists of an initial state p0(the probability to cooperate in
the initial iteration) and a vector p = {p1, p2, p3, p4} =
{pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd} where pz is the probability of playing c
when the outcome z occurred in the previous round.
Press and Dyson (Press and Dyson 2012) proved that
shortest-memory player sets the rules of the game. When the
game is indefinitely repeated, for any strategy of the longer-
memory player Y, X’s score is exactly the same as if Y had
played a certain shorter memory strategy, disregarding any
history in excess of that shared with X. This conclusion en-
ables us to focus on one memory strategies.
The probability distribution v on the set of outcomes
is a non-negative vector with unit sum, indexed by four
states, v = {vcc, vcd, vdc, vdd} = {v1, v2, v3, v4} and
v1 + v2 + v3 + v4 = 1. The probability of r-th iteration
is noted by vr. If X uses initial probability p0 and strategy
p = {p1, p2, p3, p4}, Y uses initial probability q0 and strat-
egy q = {q1, q2, q3, q4}, then the probability distribution of
the first iteration is v1 = (p0q0, p0(1− q0), (1− p0)q0, (1−
p0)(1 − q0)) and the successive outcomes follow a markov
chain with transition matrix given by:
M =
p1q1 p1(1− q1) (1− p1)q1 (1− p1)(1− q1)p2q3 p2(1− q3) (1− p2)q3 (1− p2)(1− q3)p3q2 p3(1− q2) (1− p3)q2 (1− p3)(1− q2)
p4q4 p4(1− q4) (1− p4)q4 (1− p4)(1− q4)

Each entry of M represents the probability of transition
between different states, which satisfies
Mvr = vr+1
In accordance with (Akin 2013), we will call M conver-
gent when there is a unique stationary distribution vector for
M. Although the sequence of vi(i = 1, 2, ...) may circulate
among several states and thus not converge, the sequence
of the Cesaro averages { 1n
∑n
i=1 v
i} of the outcome distri-
butions always converges to some stationary distribution v.
That is,
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
vk = v (1)
In this paper, we refer to stationary distribution as Cesaro
average defined in equation (1).
The following part briefly introduces Press and Dyson’s
conclusions of zero determinant strategies. The dot product
of an arbitrary four-vector f = {f1, f2, f3, f4} with the sta-
tionary vector v of markov matrix can be written as below.
v · f ≡ D(p,q, f)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p1q1 − 1 p1 − 1 q1 − 1 f1
p2q3 p2 − 1 q3 f2
p3q2 p3 q2 − 1 f3
p4q4 p4 q4 f4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Following this we can calculate the average payoff of sX
and sY by SX = (R,S, T, P ) and SY = (R, T, S, P ).
sX =
v · SX
v · 1 =
D(p,q,SX)
D(p,q,1)
sY =
v · SY
v · 1 =
D(p,q,SY)
D(p,q,1)
(2)
Because the scores in Eq. (2) depend linearly on their
corresponding payoff matrices S, the same is true for any
linear combination of scores, giving
αsX + βsY + γ =
D(p,q, αSX + βSY + γ1)
D(p,q,1)
(3)
If X chooses a strategy p˜ or Y chooses a strategy q˜ that
satisfies p˜ = αSX + βSY + γ1 or q˜ = αSX + βSY + γ1,
where p,q ∈ [0, 1], then the numerator in (3) vanishes to
zero. The zero determinant of D(p,q, αSX + βSY + γ1)
guarantees a linear relationship between the two scores,
αsX + βsY + γ = 0
Extortionate Strategy. Let p˜ = φ[(SX−P1)−χ(SY −
P1)], where χ ≥ 1 is the extortion factor. We have
p1 = 1− φ(χ− 1)R− P
P − S , p2 = 1− φ(1 + χ
T − P
P − S )
p3 = φ(χ+
T − P
P − S ), p4 = 0 (4)
Then the extortionate relationship is forced,
sX − P = χ(sY − P )
p = (11/13, 1/2, 7/26, 0) is concrete example of extortion-
ate strategy with the extortion factor χ = 3.
Since extortionate strategies can force an linear relation-
ship between both players’ payoffs, the co-player Y’s reac-
tion leads to disparate interesting results. If Y is an evolu-
tionary player who adjusts his strategy q according to some
optimization scheme designed to maximize his score sY , X
can extort Y and get a higher payoff. When Y is a sentient
player who knows that X is using extortionate strategy, the
game results in an ultimatum game(Thaler 1988) where Y
can choose either to cooperate(then Y is extorted) or to De-
fect(both players get a score of P).
Following Press and Dyson’s work, we solve p˜ = αSX+
βSY + γ1 in equation (3) and elicit the necessary condition
of zero determinant strategy.
Corollary 1. When R=3, S=0,T=5,P=1, a zero determinant
strategy necessarily satisfies
3 ∗ p1 − 2 ∗ p2 − 2 ∗ p3 + p4 − 1 = 0
Invincible Strategies
Stationary Distribution
The stationary vector v = {v1, v2, v3, v4} satisfies
Mv = v
v1 + v2 + v3 + v4 = 1
After abbreviation, p1 − 1 p2 − 1 p3 p4q1 − 1 q3 q2 − 1 q4p1q1 − 1 p2q3 p3q2 p4q4
1 1 1 1
v =
000
1

Let
D =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p1 − 1 p2 − 1 p3 p4
q1 − 1 q3 q2 − 1 q4
p1q1 − 1 p2q3 p3q2 p4q4
1 1 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (5)
D2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p1 − 1 0 p3 p4
q1 − 1 0 q2 − 1 q4
p1q1 − 1 0 p3q2 p4q4
1 1 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (6)
D3 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p1 − 1 p2 − 1 0 p4
q1 − 1 q3 0 q4
p1q1 − 1 p2q3 0 p4q4
1 1 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (7)
If D = 0, the stationary distribution v is not unique,
which depends on the initial distribution v1. For example,
when both players take strategy Repeat, that is, p = q =
(1, 1, 0, 0), thenD = 0 and the stationary vector v is exactly
the same as initial distribution v1.
If D 6= 0, there is a unique stationary distribution v that
is independent of initial distribution v1. Such stationary dis-
tributions can be calculated according to Cramer’s rule. We
give the value of v2 and v3, which will be used in this paper.
v2 =
D2
D
, v3 =
D3
D
(8)
Theorem 1. Assume p1, ..., p4, q1, ..., q4 ∈ [0, 1], D is de-
fined in equation (5),
D ≤ 0
Proof 1. ∀z ∈ {p1, ..., p4, q1, ..., q4},
∂2D
∂2z
= 0 (9)
Equation (9) implies that, when all variables in
{p1, ..., p4, q1, ..., q4}\z are fixed,
∂D
∂z
= C
where C is a constant independent of z. In this case, D is
monotonous to z when other variables are fixed.
Therefore we can get all extreme values of D by letting
z = 0 or z = 1, ∀z ∈ {p1, ..., p4, q1, ..., q4}
Since all of 28 = 256 extreme values are less or equal to
zero, we can conclude that D ≤ 0.
Invincible Strategies
Definition 1 (Invincible Strategy). A one memory strategy
p is invincible if against any other one memory strategy q,
sX ≥ sY , provided sX and sY exist according to (2).
Notice that according to our definition, a one memory
strategy p is invincible if it never lose against other one
memory strategies. However, according to a result by Press
and Dyson (2012), this also mean that p never lose against
any strategies as having longer memory will not help.
Theorem 2. Assume sX and sY exist according to (2), and
that v = {v1, v2, v3, v4} is the unique stationary vector,
then
sX ≥ sY ⇐⇒ v2 ≤ v3
Proof 2.
sX ≥ sY
⇐⇒ v · SX ≥ v · SY
⇐⇒ S ∗ v2 + T ∗ v3 ≥ T ∗ v2 + S ∗ v3
⇐⇒ (T − S) ∗ (v3 − v2) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ v2 ≤ v3
Theorem 3. Invincible strategy p = (p1, p2, p3, p4) must
satisfy p4 = 0.
Proof 3. Suppose p4 > 0, when p plays against Always De-
fect, from p’s perspective, the terminal states of this game
should be {dd, cd} or {cd}. In both cases, strategy p is de-
feated by strategy Always Defect.
Our main result is as follows:
Theorem 4. p = (p1, ..., p4) is invincible iff
p2 + p3 ≤ 1 (10)
p4 = 0
Proof 4. Suppose player X takes strategy p while player Y
takes strategy q. In this proof we assume D 6= 0, the edge
cases D = 0 will be discussed case by case later.
Necessity. Since p is invincible,
∀q, sX ≥ sY
According to Theorem 3, p is invincible, thus
p4 = 0 (11)
According to Theorem 2,
∀q, v2 ≤ v3
Because we suppose D 6= 0, according to (8),
∀q, D2 ≥ D3 (12)
Since p4 = 0, according to equation (6)(7),
D2 = p3q2q4 − p3q4 + p1p3q1q4 − p1p3q2q4
D3 = p2q4 − q4 + p1q1q4 − p2q3q4 − p1p2q1q4 + p1p2q3q4
Let q = (0, 0, 0, 1),
D2 = −p3, D3 = p2 − 1 (13)
According to (12),D2 ≥ D3, we have
p2 + p3 ≤ 1
With the addition to (11), we prove the necessity.
Sufficiency.
Let L =(1− p2 − p3)(1− p1q1)
+ (1− p1)p3q2 + (1− p1)p2q3
Given that p1, ..., p4, q1, ..., q3 ∈ [0, 1], and that we assume
p2 + p3 ≤ 1 in equation (10), we have
∀q1, ..., q3 ∈ [0, 1], L ≥ 0
Because we assume p4 = 0 and 0 ≤ q4 ≤ 1, notice that
q4 · L = D2 −D3
We have
∀q, D2 ≥ D3
According to Theorem 1, D ≤ 0, and we assume D 6= 0, we
have
∀q, D2
D
≤ D3
D
According to Equation (8), it’s the same as,
∀q, v2 ≤ v3
According to Theorem 2,
∀q, sX ≥ sY
Therefore, strategy p is invincible.
Theorem 5. All extortionate strategies are invincible strate-
gies.
Proof 5. According to equation set (4), extortionate strate-
gies satisfy p4 = 0.
p2 + p3 = 1 + φ(1− χ)(T + S − 2P
P − S ) (14)
Recall the setting of IPD, T + S > 2P and P > S. In
extortionate strategies, χ ≥ 1, φ > 0. Then we have p2 +
p3 < 1.
Therefore, all extortionate strategies are invincible.
Invincible strategies account for a large proportion of all
strategies. Half of firm strategies(p4 = 0) are invincible
since the hyper plane p2 + p3 ≤ 1 bisects the 3D cube
(p1, p2, p3) ∈ [0, 1] when p4 = 0. All extortionate strate-
gies are invincible so that agents cannot get rid of being
extorted and retaliate the extortioner with a win. Tit-for-
Tat(1, 0, 1, 0), with p2 +p3 = 1, is a special invincible strat-
egy which equalizes the payoff of both players. By playing
Defect in the first iteration, Tit-for-Tat can avoid being de-
feated in the beginning. Although Tit-for-Tat is invincible,
it cannot defeat other strategies, either. Always Defect is an
extreme invincible strategy but we now know that invincible
strategies are not restricted to Always Defect, which gives us
more space to explore high-score and invincible strategies.
Such strategies cannot be targeted by specially designed nat-
ural enemies.
Edge Cases
When D = 0, there are more than one terminal sets, and
the stationary distribution depends on the initial one, which
occurs when some of {p1, ..., .4, q1, ..., q4} equal to 0 or 1.
As iterated prisoner’s dilemma is usually deemed as playing
for infinite rounds, or at least an unknown large number of
rounds, the final distribution shouldn’t depend much on the
initial one (Sigmund 2010).
However, to be rigorous, we enumerate all edge cases
when D = 0 and analyse them case by case.
According to Theorem 4, we only analyze the cases where
p2 + p3 ≤ 1 and p4 = 0. The following discussion is from
p’s perspective, i.e. {cd} refers to the state where p plays c
and q plays d.
Case 1. p=(0,0,0,0). Obviously, no matter what q is, Always
Defect is invincible.
Case 2. p=(0,0,1,0). Because {cd} can only appear exactly
after {dc} except for this first iteration, this strategy is invin-
cible if the game is played for infinite rounds.
Case 3. p=(0,1,0,0). This strategy is NOT invincible since
{cd} can be a stationary distribution.
Case 4. p=(1,0,0,0). Trigger Strategy is invincible since
{cd} can only appear at most once in game history and we
assume the game is played for infinite rounds.
Case 5. p=(1,0,1,0). Tit for Tat is invincible since {cd} can
only appear exactly after {dc}, except for the first time af-
ter CC or the first iteration, which doesn’t matter when the
game is played for infinite rounds.
Case 6. p=(1,1,0,0). Obvious, Repeat is NOT invincible if
it plays C in the first iteration.
Case 7. q = (1, 1, 0, 0). Repeat is the only situation where
q can unilaterally set D = 0 when ∀z ∈ {p1, p2, p3, p4},
z 6= 0 and z 6= 1.
All edge cases can be excluded by playing Defect in the
first iteration. In this situation, p becomes Always Defect in
case 1,3,4 and 6, while in case 2 and 4, {cd} can only appear
exactly after {dc}. As for case 7, all outcomes become {dd}.
We can also assume p2 6= 1 and play Cooperate in the
first iteration , which excludes case 3 and case 6. In case
1,2,4,5, in the infinite sequence of game history, there is one
more {cd} than {dc}. In terms of stationary distribution and
average payoff, losing the shot game once doesn’t make any
(a) p=(0.5,0.2,0.7,0) (b) p=(0.5,0.7,0.2,0)
(c) p=(0.5,0.7,0.8,0) (d) p=(0.5,0.7,0.2,0.4)
Figure 1: Stochastic Calculation
difference. As for case 7, suppose q is Always Defect, {dd}
is the only absorbing state while {cd} is only a transient
state, thus strategy p is still invincible.
Stochastic Calculation
Figure 1 displays the result of stochastic calculation. Given
a strategy p, enumerate the strategy of q and display all
of the stationary distributions in terms of v2 and v3. Be-
cause all distributions form a compact convex hull1, we can
make discrete samples to get the shape. According to Akin’s
Lemma(Akin 2013) and the property v1 +v2 +v3 +v4 = 1,
we can represent v1, v4 by v2, v3 and visualize the final re-
sults in two dimensional plane when strategy p is fixed.
Lemma 1 (Akin’s Lemma). Assume that X uses the strategy
p with X Press-Dyson vector p˜ = {p1−1, p2−1, p3, p4}. If
the opponent Y uses a strategy pattern that yields a sequence
of distributions {vn}, then
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
< vk · p˜ >= 0
and so < v · p˜ >= v1p˜1 + v2p˜2 + v3p˜3 + v4p˜4 = 0.
Figure 1(a) and figure 1(b) are positive examples. As is
shown, all results are above the line of v2 = v3, which
means v3 ≥ v2 in all stationary distributions. The result
of figure 1(b) is counterintuitive because pcd = 0.7, which
means that even if it was defected in the previous round,
its probability of cooperation is as high as 0.7. Although
it seems to be easily defeated, it is still invincible because
it satisfies Theorem 4. Figure 1(c) is a counter example
where p2 + p3 > 1. For this kind of strategy, Always De-
fect can merely reach a tie of Punishment, but strategies like
(0, 0, 0, 1) can defeat it and thus get a higher payoff. Fig-
ure 1(d) is a counter example where p4 > 0, which can be
defeated by Always Defect.
1Due to the limited space, we don’t give a formal proof of this
property.
(a) p=(0.5,0.2,0.7,0) (b) p=(0.5,0.7,0.2,0)
Figure 2: ABM Result
Stochastic Calculation ABM(1000 rounds)
p1 (0.142,0.150,0.272,0.437) (0.152,0.141,0.270,0.437)
p2 (0.080,0.077,0.314,0.529) (0.076,0.076,0.309,0.539)
Table 3: Stationary Distributions
Experiment
We have modeled IPD as a Markov Process and calculated
stationary distribution. In this section, we use agent based
modeling(ABM) to take experiments. We research in the
following questions,
• Does the result of ABM accord with stochastic calcula-
tion?
• How many iterations does it approximately take to reach
the stationary distribution?
• Can invincible strategies defeat other strategies besides
one memory strategies?
• What’s the evolutionary behavior of invincible strategies?
Pairwise Competition
We use Java to model the behavior of agents in IPD. All
agents take one memory strategies and outcomes of ev-
ery round are recorded. Two invincible strategies p1 =
{0.5, 0.2, 0.7, 0} and p2 = {0.5, 0.7, 0.2, 0} play against
a specific normal strategy q = {0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.3} respec-
tively. The game is played for 1000 rounds. The percentage
of each state is recorded after each round and the percentage
of v2, v3 is shown in Figure 2. The distribution gradually
becomes stable after approximately 500 and 750 rounds re-
spectively. Table 3 compares the result of stochastic calcu-
lation(see section Stationary Distribution) and agent-based
modeling. After 1000 iterations, the result of ABM has al-
most converged to the result of stochastic calculation.
Look back at the Stewart’s tournament. The result that
Extort-2 can be ranked in second place with respect to
pairwise competitions is not due to its extortionate prop-
erty, but to its invincible property. Extortionate strate-
gies are only special when it is faced with evolutionary
agents. To verify this, we rerun this tournament with
the help of Axelrod Python library(Knight et al. 2016).
We replace Extort-2 strategy with an invincible strategy
(1,0.7,0.2,0),who plays D in the first iteration. According
to Corollary 1, (1,0.7,0.2,0) is not a zero determinant strat-
egy, nor is extortionate strategy.
Strategy Score Invincible vs.
ZD-GTFT-2 2.79 win
GTFT 2.59 win
Tit For Tat(C) 2.54 win
Tit For 2 Tats 2.41 win
Hard Prober 2.39 win
Win-Stay Lose-Shift 2.32 win
Hard Tit For 2 Tats 2.30 win
Random 2.11 win
Cooperator 2.07 win
Prober 2.01 win
Grudger 2.00 win
Hard Go By Majority 2.00 tie
Hard Tit For Tat 1.99 win
Calculator 1.90 win
Prober 1.86 win
Prober 1.77 win
Joss 1.69 win
Invincible Strategy 1.60 -
Defector 1.57 tie
Table 4: Tournament with Invincible Strategies
Each pairwise game is played for 1000 iterations to get a
more accurate approximation of stationary distribution. The
result of head-to-head matches is displayed in table 4. Com-
pared to Extort-2 in Stewart’s tournament, this invincible
strategy has higher average payoff (1.60 vs. 1.58) and wins
more head-to-head matches(16 vs. 14). Therefore, we can
conclude that extortionate strategies have no advantage in
Axelrod’s tournament other than it is an invincible strategy.
Stewart’s tournament contains not only one memory
strategies. Tit-For-Two-Tats is a two memory strategy,
Prober is a stochastic strategy and GoByMajority even ex-
amines the entire history. To some extent, this tournament
result verifies our assumption that shortest memory players
set the rule of the game, which enables us to focus on one
memory strategies.
Evolutionary Behaviour
Hilbe et al. (Hilbe, Nowak, and Sigmund 2013) analyzed the
evolutionary performance of extortionate strategies. They
concluded that extortionate strategies can act as catalysts for
the evolution of cooperation but that they are not the sta-
ble outcome of natural selection. We rerun their experiment
and replace extortionate strategy with our invincible strat-
egy (0.9,0.7,0.2,0), and the result turns out to be similar.
In Axelrods original work(Hamilton and Axelrod 1981) an
ecological approach based on the payoff matrix of the tour-
nament was used to study the evolutionary stability of each
strategy. We take Moran Process(Lieberman, Hauert, and
Nowak 2005) in our experiment, because it is much more
widely used in the literature. In Figure 3(a), win stay lose
shift(WSLS) strategy is dominated by Defector and finally
dies out. After adding some invincible agents, WSLS domi-
nates this population(Figure 3(b)).
To explain this experimental result, we define Semi-
Cooperative Invincible Strategy.
Definition 2 (Semi-Cooperative Invincible). A strategy p =
(p1, ..., p4) is semi-cooperative invincible if it plays Cooper-
ate in the first iteration and satisfies,
0.5 < p1 < 1
p2 + p3 ≤ 1
p4 = 0
Such semi-cooperative invincible strategies can act as cat-
alyst of cooperation(Figure 3(a),3(b)) because it has the fol-
lowing properties when the game is played for a finite num-
ber of rounds. (1) When such strategies play against defec-
tive strategies such as Always Defect, the distribution will
quickly fall into DD, thus both players receive a reward of
P. (2)When such strategies play against cooperative strate-
gies, such as WSLS and Cooperate, the distribution will hold
at CC for a number of rounds, resulting a payoff of R.
(3)When such strategies play among themselves, it’s better
than defective but worse than cooperative so that the average
payoff is between (1) and (2). As a result, when the agent
with lowest payoff is eliminated, Always Defect has the
least average payoff, followed by semi-cooperative invinci-
ble strategy, and finally cooperative strategy. Such property
make semi-cooperative invincible strategy seem like a cata-
lyst of cooperation.
(a) WSLS, Defector (b) WSLS, Defector, Invincible
(c) One Population (d) Two Allies
Figure 3: Evolutionary Results
Following Hilbe’s discussion of extortionate strategy
between two populations(Hilbe, Nowak, and Sigmund
2013)(Hilbe et al. 2014), we take similar experiment to sim-
ulate the performance of invincible strategies when they
form an alliance. In a single population invincible strate-
gies need to compete with their own kind, which decreases
their payoff. However, when invincible strategies evolve in
one of two separate populations, they will show their battle
effectiveness. We still take Moran Process and build a bipar-
tite graph of players(Shakarian, Roos, and Moores 2013), of
which one party contains invincible players while the other
party contains other strategies. When all players in one pop-
ulation, cooperative strategies such as Cooperator and Tit
for Tat dominates this society(Figure 3(c)). After invincible
strategies forms an ally and play against the other popula-
tion, they dominate this ecosystem(Figure 3(d)).
Conclusion and Future Work
Inspired by the fact that no strategies can defeat extortionate
strategy, we discovered invincible strategies which will not
lose head-to-head matches if the game is played for a large
enough number of iterations. We give a concise characteri-
zation of such strategies and verifies it by experiments.
Replacing extortionate strategy with some other invinci-
ble strategies, we conduct tournaments and evolutionary ex-
periments which aim to analyze the similarity between ex-
tortionate strategy and invincible strategy. Our results show
that the properties of extortionate strategies discovered by
recent works, such as winning head-to-head matches and
acting as catalyst for cooperation, are actually the proper-
ties of some invincible strategies. Extortionate strategies are
only special when it plays with an evolutionary player so
that it can direct the co-player’s evolutionary direction.
In addition to reproducing experiments in related works,
we also give mathematical insights of such phenomena,
which explains why extortionate strategies can win head-
to-head matches by invincible condition(Theorem 4), illus-
trates why it can be catalyst of cooperation in one popula-
tion(Definition 2) and dominant another population.
Although winning pairwise competition is not every-
thing(Adami and Hintze 2013), keeping the invincible con-
dition in mind, sentient agents are able to evaluate the vul-
nerability of the co-player. Given that invincible strategies
are not restricted to Always Defect, it’s now possible to
explore high-payoff and invincible strategies. The invinci-
ble property guarantees the lower bound of agents’ payoff,
which improves environmental adaptability of agents.
In future works, we will analyze why generous zero deter-
minant strategy can achieve the maximum score in Stewart’s
tournament. Current research of scores requires a specific
distribution of co-players, which is not stable when experi-
ment configuration varies. We will continue our research of
one memory strategies and focus on the average payoff of
pairwise competitions. We hope that our research can take
more insights into iterated prisoner’s dilemma.
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